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What incentives do countries hiave to repay Defaulters paid highcr spreads than loans'? Do banks credibly punish borrowers that nondelaulters, and the def.aulters that rcneged on belhave badly -and if so. how? Two explanallarger portions of' thcir past debt paid (even) lions are commonlkv of'lered l'or whv countries higher spreads. repay debts: (I ) to preserve tlheir reputation as a goo(i borrower or (2) to avoid direct sanctions.
Ozler also lound that countiies that acquirdl such as trade sanctions or thc s urc of overseas sovereignty more recently were charged higher assets.
spreads than other countries.
O/ler empirically investigated rhc elfect of' These findings apply durino an expansionist repayment problems in carlier cras on thc period. During an earlier crisis stage. markets spreads paid by developing countr) borrowers in failed to discriminate between b orrowers thalt thc 1I970s. She found thalt creditor banks did ''haved badly" and thosc thall (lid not. take account ofl x)rro%crs' default histories. ' lie lPRL WVorking Plaper SCriCS fiIcinimintC thc linfrding of work lln(dCr v.a\ in thc Ranks lPoIIcy Rcsc;art.h. :and E \Atel'n Affair 'Coin plevx Ani ol-let x oft Ili seti iL' is to )t t til c. f ink in g on qlit iqk i. Iv\ The question considered, the relevance of default histories of borrowers, is of gteat importance to understand whether and how banks can credibly punish badly behaved borrowers, and, thus, why a country has any incentive to repay.I In the recent body of ever growing theoretical literature on international lending, two distinct, but not exclusive, explanations for repayment of foreign debt are given. First, the reputational approch, assumes that a debtor's primary incentive to make repayments is to preserve its reputation as a good borrower (the seminal paper is Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) 2). The second approach assumes that the primary motivation for repayment is the threat of direct sanctions, such as seizure of overseas assets and trade sanctions, that lenders can impose by influencing creditor country legislators (Bulow and Rogoff (1989 a,b) 3). It is argued that having a reputation to pay does not enhance the borrowing ability of a developing country.
The belief, that primary motivation for repavment is the threat of direct sanctions, is based on creditors' legal svstem. The legal system typically gives right to the creditor government to seize a debtor's assets in the event of a default (enforcing the right beyond the juristiction of the creditor's go-ernment requires the c3operation of another governmen:).
It is, however, difficult to justify the levels of existing debt, which has an aggregate market value of hundreds of billions of dollars despite the sizable discounts in the secondary markets, with this belief.4 The threat of seizing overseas assets will not suffice if the borrower is a net debtor and the overseas assets are small, which currently is the case for many debtors. The threat of reducing the defaulting country's gains from trade is also problematic, since the creditor countries stand to lose along with the debtor from such an impediment. Unle3ss -ceditor countries are willing to bear this cost, the banks threat to impose such sanctions may not be credible.5 Thus, it appears, that short of military interventions to enforce a debt contract, which presumably are a thing of the past, direct sanctions are not sufficient.6
The current paper's contribution is a systematic, empirical investigation of the much debated issue of 'relevance of past defaults' in credit market access. The findings are important for providing validity for reputational approach.7
In this paper we investigate 2184 bank loans made to 70 developing countries during [1968] [1969] [1970] [1971] [1972] [1973] [1974] [1975] [1976] [1977] [1978] [1979] [1980] [1981] . 27 of these countries had sovereign borrowing experience during the former episodes of lending. The repayment problems of these countries pertain to: 1820 through the 1930s and the post war (1955) (1956) (1957) (1958) (1959) (1960) (1961) (1962) (1963) (1964) (1965) (1966) (1967) (1968) period. The primary finding of this paper is that countries with histories of default were charged higher interest rates than countries with no default history. Defulaters paid nearly 2-4 percent more to private creditors for interest servicing in the 1970s than they would had they not defaulted earlier. Second, we find that the countries that a,quired sovereignty recently, e.g. many African countries, paid higher spreads than countries that had bad repayment records. These findings are robust to alternative speciica Iioons ot economic and political characteristics of the borrowers, that are errploved to control for other determinants of credit terms.
How and whether banks can credibly punish defaulting borrowers has vast welfare and policy implications, s'evond its relevance for the current academic debate. Among these implications are whether borrowers should take into account future inability to borrow in their decision to default, and whether banks should direct their resources to lobbying to influence the creditor country legal system that makes the imposition of direct penalties more effective.
A main policy implication of our findings, therefore, is that boriower country governments should be concerned with future difficulties in accessing credit markets in their decision to default.
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The findings in this paper are in contrast to those of other empirical studies that address the issue, which differ in terms of their methodologies and the period of study. In the first set of these studies, a period of stagnation in lending following a period of widespread defaults is investigated. The main finding is that borrowers that behaved "well" during the general default crisis did not have easier access to credit markets than others (Eichengreen (1987) , Jorgensen and Sachs (1988) , Lindert (1988) ).
The second set of studies analyzed the behaviour in the syndicated loan market in its expansion stage, the 1970s (Lindert and Morton (1977), and Chowdry (1988) 
2.
Ezoirical Issues
Methodology
The impact of a borrower's repavment history on the credit terms it later faces in the Eurocurrency r..arket is examined. In the Eurocurrency credit market the rate of interest has two components: the interbank interest rate, which represents the cost of capital to banks, and the spread above the interbank rate. The interbank interest rate is excgenous to the lending decision to specific borrowers. Hence, the determination of spreads will be investigated, with particular regard to the relevance of repayment histories.
The relationship between the spread, s, and the probability of default, p, can be posited (see Feder and Just (1977), Edwards (1984) ) as:
where 0 represents other variables, such as the discount rate that affect the spread ( For notational convenience the subscripts that would indicate country-and time-periods are not employed. 
2.2.a Economic Determinants of Spreads
Two types of variables are considered as possible economic determinants of the spreads. First, some characteristics of the loan contract, second, borrower characteristics which are important in measuring the riskiness of the borrower are used.
Characteristics of the loan contract that are possible determinants of spreads are: a dummy variable that indicates whether the borrowing is public or publicly guaranteed, a dummy variable that indicates if the loan is syndicated, and maturity of the loan. A possible problem could arise from the inclusion of maturity to the extent that banks determine spread and maturity simultaneously. However, based upon practices in the Eurocurrency market and the previous literature, loan maturity is assumed to be determined prior to the spread determination (Euromoney (1970), Feder and Just (1977b), Edwards, (1984) ).
To capture borrower characteristics, that are presumably important in measuring r_e riskiness of -le borrower, we emploved variables that are similar those in previous s-.u(ties of crodit terms: total debt-to-CNP ratio, debt seryice-to-exparts ratio, imports to GNP ratio, GNP growth.
lagged value of investment to GNP ratio, rate of devaluation and rate of inflation.1 In addition, the existence of IMF standby agreemenits between 1955 dnd our sample perod is considered. This variable is incorporated as a measure of economic difficulties of the recent past, and an earlier indicator of recent repayments problems, which may not be captured by the other variabl-s employed.
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The expected signs of these indicators have been discussed extensively in the literature ( for reviews see McDonough (1982) , Eaton and Taylor (1986) and Edwards (1984)), hence we will only briefly comment on this issue. Total debt to GNP ratio is expected to exibit a positive sign, since it can be considered as an indicator of solvency for a country. Liquidity problems will be measured by the ratio of debt service to exports and the sign of this coefficient is expected to be positive. Reserves to GNP ratio is an indicator of the level of International liquidity of a country, thus it is expected to have a negative sign. Ratio of investment to GNP will be negatively related to spreads, since it indicates the prospects of a countries future growth. Rat.o of imports to GNP is expected to have a negrtive coefficient as it measureF che vulnerability of the borrower to trade embargos. Alternatively positive sign would be expected to the extent that it measures the vulnerability of a country to outside shocks. Higher rate of growth is argued to result in lower probability of non-payment.
High inflation is employed as an indicator of a larger probability of balance of payments crisis. Rate of devaluation is used to measure a countrv's willingness to use exchange rate adjustments to avoid balance of payments crisis.
As an alternative empirical specification of borrowers' characteristics, we implemented a procedure similar to Ozler and Tabellini (1990) . For this specification the contract level data are aggregeted to annual level (annual weighted average of spreads are calculated where the weights are the amounts of Ican contracted for each contract within that year). Reserves to gdp, and ratio of exports .o major creditors as a share of total exports are incorporated to measure the vulnera.ility of a country to non-payment penalties. Agriculture as a share of gdp is used as an indicator of economic instability that affects a borrowers capacity to pay.
Real gdp per capita, total debt to gnp, and presence of IMF stanby agreements are also incorporated.
2.2.b. Political Determinants of Spreads
An important addition to the set of economic variables discussed is the introduction borrowers' political characteristics. The theoretical model considered by Ozler and Tabellini (1990) isolates the discount factor as an important parameter in a country's level of external borrowing. Previous work by Alesina and Tabellini (1989) , and Cukierman, Edwards and Tabellini (1989) showed that the size of the discount factor for a country reflects an important feature of the political system: namely, the degree of political instability, defined as the probability of imminent goverment change.
Accordingly, it is important to incorporate such political factors as potential determinants of the spreads so as to ensure that the results in this investigation are robust to this c-Lsideration.
The measure of political instability employed here, which is an annual estimate of probability of government change, is the same as in Ozler and Tabellini (1990) , and similar to that of Cukierman, Edwards and Tabellini 
Sample Characteristics
In what follows the average spreads in the sample for three country groupings will be described. Overall, these averages indicate that the countries that acquired sovereignty recently, were charged higher rates than countries that were sovereign but had defaulted on their foreign debt; the sovereign countries with default record, were charged higher spreads than the sovereign countries with no default record. Table 2 ). For this purpose, we collected the countries that were not sovereign at any time during the period of 1820 through 1930s, with the countries that were scvereign but had no repayment problems, and assigned zeros to all those countries (countries with "unblemished repayment records"). Countries that were sovereign and had repayment problems were assigned ones. It is interesting to observe that when countries are grouped in this way are the spreads of "good" countries (LD 30 20 zero) higher than those of "bad" ones.
In contrast to above procedure, we next look at only the countries that were sovereign and compare the mean spreads of defaulters to those of nondefaulters, as they were described for various historical episodes in Table- 1. Table 2 indicates that defaulters paid higher spreads than nondefaulters for each definition of the dummv variable.16 (An "F" test rejects the null hypothesis that the means of the two samples are equal.)
One may suspect that the above results ar. a consequence of timing of borrowing for the countires in our sample, since the entry dates of countries to the market under consideration differ and that the spreads varied over-time. However, the finding that defatilters paid higher average spreads than non-defaulters hold separatelv for each year of the sample.
For everv vear in the data, the nuil hvpothesis that the means of the two ii samples are equal is rejected.
Estimation Results
The estimation of equation (2) yields three important findings consistent with the sample averages reported above: First, countries that were sovereign in the former episodes of lending were contracted lower spreads in comparison to the countries that acquired sovreignty recently.
Second, countries that were sovereign and defaulted were charged higher spreads than countries that were sovereign and did not default. It is important to note that more recent defaults are found to have been more important in influencing the spreads: defaults prior to 1930s did not have any impact, defaults of the 1930s, and repayment problems of the [1955] [1956] [1957] [1958] [1959] [1960] [1961] [1962] [1963] [1964] [1965] [1966] [1967] [1968] period had a significant impact. Third, defaulters that reneged larger portions of their debt were charged higher spreads than ones that reneged smaller portions of their debt. Finally, these results are robust to considering borrowers' political characteristics as potential determinants of spreads. The results are presented in tables 3-7 as will be discussed below. In this discussion the focus will be on the sovereignty and repavment dummy variables (a discussion of remaining variables is contained in the previous section).
In the first columns of Table 3 and In the second column of Table 3 and Table 4 , the impact of defaults in the 19Qs are Presented. The sample is restricted onlv to those countries that were sovereign borrowers in the period. The dummy variable D30 is estimated to have a positive and statisticallv significant effect on the spread (the coefficient of this dummy variable is .11, and .10 in the two alternative specifications with respective t-values of 4.9, and 2.1).
In Table 5 , a summary of estimated parameter and 't' values for the remaining dummy variables that were described in tables 1 and 2 are presented. The model presented for this estimation is the one of The main finding of this paper is that defaulters were penalized by being charged worse credit terms than non-defaulters. In contrast, the established view appears to be that creditors have paid little attention to the debt histories of developing countries, as is evident in recent citations:
"The empirical case for the pure reputation approach is also weak. Eichengreen (1987) and Lindert and Morton (1987) both show that, historically, past repayment records have had little bearing on a countrv's abilitv to borrow." (Bulow and Rogoff (1989, p 158 , see also Bulow and Rogoff (1988, p. 1 8 ) for a similar citation).
"..the major banks... did not discriminate between countries that had or had not defaulted in the past, or those that had or had not required rechedulings by charging the former higher premiums." Schwartz (1989, p 8-9) .
The view that default historv is not important is based on two sets of studies: those that investigate a period of stagna:ion in lending following a a perird of widespread defaults, and those that investigate an default. histories of borrowers in the former episodes of lending (1820 through the 1930s). The important similarity to the present paper is that both of those studies focus to a period of boom in the financial markets. A boom that was separated from the previous widespread non-payment crisis by a period of stagnancy in lending. Their conclusions are that defaulters were not penalized, in fact it appeared that they paid less than governments with "unblemished records". Our finding is in contrast to theirs despite v.erv similar methodology and same data sources. The difference, as demonstrated in this paper, is a consequence of how one defines "unblemished repayment record". in their investigations, countries in the unblemished record group contain not only governments with good repayment records, but also governments that had no record because they were not sovereign in the former episodes of lending.
Our result, that creditors paid attention to repayment record of borrowers, is consistent with that of Eichengreen and Portes (1989 Eichengreen (1987) analvsed borrowed amounts by a cross section of 32 countries in the first post-war decade, and found no apparent relation between the severity of interwar defaults and the ability to borrow immediately after World Wir II. Jorgensen and Sachs (1988) focused on six Latin American countries and concluded that the non-defaulter This evidence suggests that financial market behaviour differs during periods of stagnancy or buoyancy in terms of its tendency to discriminate among countries according to their past repayment record. During a period of buoyancy, when defaults are isolated events, the financial markets appear to focus on creditworthiness of particular countries. During a period of widespread repayment problems, however, lenders do not seem to pay attention to creditworthiness of particular borrowers.
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One plausible way of interpreting these facts is to take an approach analogous to that of Sachs (1983) (a similar idea is also in Krugman (1985) ). In that framework, a borrower with large outstanding debt to a large number of small creditors, though fundamentally healthy, experiences a liquidity crisis and is unable to obtain loans in a competitive equilibrium. This is because, each individual bank that has an upward sloping schedule of loan supplies to the country, which is itself a consequence of upward sloping cost of funds, develops the expectation that all other banks will stop lending to that countrv.
Aralogously, when defaults become frequent and reach a certain threshold level, banks mav develop beliefs that all borrower countries will tail to make payments leading to a general cut-off of lending. From the point of view of the borrower countries, the notion that banks have developed such expectations, and, therefore, no new loans will be forthcoming will make generalized defaults more likely. This is because even solvent countries will find it worth while to default since they expect that in the future they will be penalized even if they do not default.
Thus, it is rational for each bank to stop lending on the basis of these expectations. In addition, the latter becomes self-confirming, and a widespread crisis emerges. Overall, this discussion suggests that, except for a crisis situation of generalized defaults, banks do pay attention the borrowers reputation of good or bad behaviour.
Conclusions
This paper investigates the impact of historical defaults on terms for bank loans in developing countries during 1968-81. The primary finding is that those countries that had repayment problems were charged higher spreads than countries that had good repayment record, during the 1970s. In addition, more recent defaults are found to have had a more significant impact: defults of the 1820-1929 period are not important in the determination of spreads, in contrast, defaults of the 1930s are found to be significant determinats of spreads, and the repayment difficulties of the 1955-68 period have had even a stronger impact on the spreads.
It is interesting that the repayment behaviour of countries as far back as the 1930s have mattered, even though they matter less than recent reschedulings with government creditors and the IMF stanby agreements, both of which would be considered as signs of more recent repayment difficulties. stagnancy or buoyancy in terms of its tendency to discriminate among countries according to their past repavment record. Second, the fink..ncial market's tendencv to focus oni creditworthiness of particular countries may depend on whether defaults are isolated events or are widespread phenomena.
FOOTNOTES
'Contract enforecement problems are ignored in some studies which suggest that there should be a greater integration of world capital markets.
For a survev of the empirical evidence on international capital mobility see Obstfeld (1986) .
See also Eaton (1989) , Eaton Gersovitz and Stiglitz (1986) , English and Cole (1987) . Grossman and van Huvk (1988) , Kletzer and Wright (1990), and Manuelli (1986) .
For details of historical military invasion to enforce debt claims, "gun-boat technology" see Winkler (1933) , Borchard and Wynne (1951) and Dammers (1984) .
-7 'Additional Empirical support for reputational approach is in Ozler (1990) . Evidence presented in that work suggest that credit terms in the 1970s were affected by contemporenaous repayment behaviour of the borrowers.
8In reality, whether a government will, in fact, take such future penalties into consideration will, of course, be affected by its expectations concerning staving in power in the future.
Data on fees and commissions are not available. Previous studies such as Feder and Just (1977b) and Edwards (1984) also suffer from this inadequacy. It is noted, however, that these costs are low relative to spreads (see . 10 To illustrate this assume that loans are for one period, and default means complete loss of both the principal and the interest rate. Let si-i* where i* is the LIBOR rate and i is the interest rate charged to a countrv. Then the equilibrium condition is (l-p) (l+i) -(l+i*), which yields equation (1) where 9 = (l+i*). This structure has been implemented bv Edwards TIntroduction of Tore realistic assumptions yield a similar str1c-,ire, foir ex..l;ple ,-c-e Feder and Just (1977) .
1,
The logistic form is expressed as
12A cursory inspection of the data suggests that the cyclical pattern of spreads over time are related to some global and macroeconomic events such as the oil shocks and industrialized country growth rates. These two variables are also correlated with the number of banks that entered the Eurocurrency market. Hence a more sophisticated approach would require a model that employs such variables to explain the spread behaviour over time.
1 3 Loan data for the 1973-81 period are obtained from various issues of the World Bank's Borrowing in International CaDital Markets. The data for the prior period, however, have been obtained through an exhaustive search of the financial press as well as the central bank reports of the borrower countries. For more details on this data set see Ozler (1990) .
14 For reviews of this literature see McDonald (1982) and Eaton and Taylor (1986) . The debt-service ratio, imports to GNP ratio, imports to reserves ratio, GNP growth, and investment to GNP ratios are among the variables that are found to have significant impact on spreads.
The total debt, and debt service variables are obtained from the World Bank's World Debt Tables. The remaining vari-ables are obtained from IMF's International Financial Statistics. 15Among the 27 countries that were sovereign, the countries that did not have standby agreements during the period are Egypt, Greece, newZealand, Portugal, Taiwan and Thailand.
16 Since Lindert and Morton (1987) use the spread data for the 1976-1980 we have also conducted our investigation by constaining our sample period to [1976] [1977] [1978] [1979] [1980] . All the findings continue to hold. The data are annual. The estimation results for the set of other variables employed in equation (2) are presented in Table 3 . The data are annual for the 'political' variables.
